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a b s t r a c t 
Urban consolidation centers provide the logistical infrastructure for cooperation among less-than- 
truckload carriers with contiguous destinations. The rising number of initiatives to establish and oper- 
ate urban consolidation centers and their low success rates signal the need for better mechanisms to 
manage cooperation in this context. We introduce and study cooperative situations comprising a set of 
carriers with time sensitive deliveries who can consolidate their cargo to obtain savings. We introduce 
the class of Dispatch Consolidation (DC) games and search for ways to fairly allocate the obtained sav- 
ings among the participating carriers. When delivery capacities are not restrictive, i.e. when waiting costs 
trigger truck dispatches, we show that stable allocations in the core always exist and can, in their en- 
tirety, be found by solving a compact linear program. With restrictive capacities, however, the core of a 
DC game may become empty. We introduce the notion of component-wise core for DC games to preserve 
stability first and foremost among the carriers whose deliveries are dispatched together in the chosen 
optimal solutions. The novelty of our approach is to link the stability requirements of an allocation rule 
with the structure of selected solutions for the underlying optimization problems. We characterize the 
component-wise cores of DC games, prove their non-emptiness, and suggest proportionally calculated 
allocations therein. Finally, we discuss a refinement of component-wise core allocations that minimizes 
envy among the carriers who are dispatched separately. 
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 































s  1. Introduction 
The outlook of logistics and transportation industry presents
one of the major paradoxes of our times. The ever increasing need
for better, cheaper, and more responsive products and services
drives the industry towards growth and efficiency on both local
and global scales. On the other hand, modern life has never
been so grappled with problems of pollution, congestion, and
a myriad of environmental issues that are negatively impacted
by the logistics and transportation sector. Road transportation
alone is responsible for more than 20% of total carbon emissions
in European Commission (2017) . At the same time, more than
20% for all truck movements in Europe is completely empty
( Eurostat, 2018 )—and the remainder is hardly ever full. Despite
the fruitfulness of research on optimizing routes, schedules, and
networks for individual organizations involved in transport and
logistics, the next level of efficiency obtained by increasing the∗ Corresponding author. 






0377-2217/© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) conomies of scale can only be made possible via collaboration
mong individual operators. 
Although collaboration can positively affect almost all aspects of
he transportation and logistics sector ( Newing, 2008 ), an increas-
ngly promising context for collaborative logistics is consolidation
enters. A consolidation center is a logistical facility that is used to
ombine loads of various carriers and to construct delivery plans
hat are either more economical (e.g. via better utilized trucks)
r have higher service levels (e.g. via faster turnouts) ( Morana,
onzalez-Feliu, & Semet, 2014 ). A recent study commissioned by
ransport For London finds that the use of Construction Consol-
dation Centers can reduce freight traffic to construction sites by
ver 70% ( Mayor of London, 2016 ). By 2005, there has been over
0 documented cases of consolidation centers in Europe ( Browne,
weet, Woodburn, & Allen, 2005 )—though with various levels of
uccess. Allen, Browne, Woodburn, and Leonardi (2012) report 114
ocumented implementation cases of consolidation centers in 17
ountries by 2012. There are several pieces of evidence showing
hat consolidation centers are heavily supported by governments
nd urban authorities to remedy increasing logistical side-effectsunder the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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t  f congestion and pollution ( Duin, Quak, & Muñuzuri, 2010; Hoyer,
likker, & Van Woensel, 2012; Paddeu, 2017 ). 
Given the potential benefits of consolidation centers and the
evel of support that they receive, one would expect to see their
uccessful and sustained operations all around the world. But this
s not the case. Quak and Tavasszy (2011) report that among more
han 100 initiatives in urban logistics collaborations, more than
alf of them fail during implementation. One of the main barriers
o success of consolidation centers is the deficiency of the mech-
nisms they use to share the obtained savings among, or cover
he incurred costs from, the participants. In fact, carriers may hes-
tate to collaborate as long as they do not have a clear understand-
ng of the mechanisms employed and whether or not they receive
 fair share out of collaborative operations. Nordtømme, Bjerkan,
nd Sund (2015) report, as one of the main success barriers for
slo’s consolidation center, that “there was no plan for how costs
ould be financed and who would benefit from saved costs”. The
ack of consensus on fair cost/gain sharing schemes as a barrier
o collaboration in wider logistics context is empirically confirmed
y Cruijssen, Cools, and Dullaert (2007) . As a result, consolidation
enters are often destined to disappear when governmental subsi-
ies are lost ( Verlinde, Macharis, & Witlox, 2012 ). 
In this paper, we construct a model to study collaboration
mong carriers via urban consolidation centers. The carriers have
eliveries that are destined for the same area (e.g. a city center or
 commercial/construction site). Instead of driving to their desti-
ations, the carriers’ trucks can arrive at the consolidation center,
nload their cargo, and move on to carry out their other fulfill-
ents. Their cargo would sit in the consolidation center in order to
e bundled into full-truck loads (see Fig. 1 ). The amounts of sav-
ngs that the carriers obtain are dependent on their dispatch times,
.e. the deliveries are time-sensitive. This is in line with previous
tudies emphasizing that the main costs of deliveries in the con-
olidation centers are time-related costs ( Janjevic & Ndiaye, 2017 ).
o materialize the full benefits of load consolidation, collaborating
arties delegate decision making authorities regarding bundling
nd dispatching of their cargo to a consolidation center operator. 1 
aving the delivery information of all carriers, the consolidation
enter operator in our model first determines the set of carriers1 The execution of collaboration via a decision making entity is common and can 
e seen, for example, in cooperative logistics ( Özener & Ergun, 2008 ) and coopera- 




hose deliveries are accepted to be handled by the consolidation
enter. Incorporating such selection option allows for the exclusion
f deliveries that cannot be profitably consolidated—for example,
hen a carrier’s delivery size is already close to a full-truckload.
he consolidation center operator then decides the dispatch times
f accepted deliveries. Finally, savings allocated to each carrier are
etermined. As we show, the problem of allocating the savings ob-
ained by collaboration in the consolidation center is equivalent to
etermining the players’ shares of dispatched trucks’ costs. Know-
ng the rules of the game, players decide whether or not to collab-
rate with others in consolidating their loads, and if so who they
re willing to collaborate with. 
Finding appropriate gain/cost-sharing methods is the main fo-
us of this paper. This problem is extensively studied within the
ramework of cooperative game theory (see for example Peleg &
udhölter, 2007 ). One of the most important gain-sharing rules
n cooperative game theory literature is the core ( Shapley, 1955 ). 2 
ased on the notion of stability, allocations in the core of a coop-
rative game distribute the total savings obtained by cooperation
n a way that sub-groups of players, also called coalitions, cannot
bject to their combined allocated savings being less than what
hey could achieve on their own. The latter requirement for allo-
ations have several other desirable properties as well (see for ex-
mple Peleg, 1992 ). One of the practically appealing properties of
ore allocations is their efficiency with regard to the set of play-
rs that positively contribute to realization of total savings. That is,
f a coalition of players together generates the entire savings, then
very allocation in the core distributes the total savings exclusively
mong those players. Thus, the players whose exclusion does not
educe the savings are allocated with no additional savings (the
o-called dummy property Peleg & Sudhölter, 2007 ). The example
elow illustrates this point. 
xample 1. Three carriers, each with half a tuck-load cargo, must
eliver to a city center. An urban consolidation center provides
pportunities for combining cargo and dispatching full truck-loads.
t would not make economical sense for a carrier to come to the
onsolidation center and be dispatched individually in a half-full
ruck. As the result, only two carriers would be selected to arrive
t the consolidation center and one has to transport his cargo2 It is worth mentioning that although the literature often associates the def- 
nition of the core to Gillies (1959) , as shown by Zhao (2018) , it was Shapley 
1955) who first defined the core in its current form. 






















































































































directly. Assume that carriers 1 and 2 as well as carriers 2 and 3
can combine their cargo together and obtain 60 units of savings.
Carriers 1 and 3, arriving too far from each other to the consoli-
dation center, cannot gain any savings from combining their cargo.
Suppose eventually carriers 1 and 2 are selected to consolidate
their cargo, and carrier 3, not being accepted to arrive at the
consolidation center, transports his delivery directly. The (unique)
stable allocation in the core gives 60 units of savings completely to
carrier 2 and leaves other two players with zero allocated saving. 
The stable allocation in example above does not allocate any
savings to the carrier who is not selected to arrive at the consoli-
dation center. If the latter condition is violated, carriers 1 and 2—
hose cargoes are eventually dispatched together via the consoli-
dation center—can object to the idea of giving away a positive part
of their jointly generated savings to carrier 3. 
Despite the desirable features of core allocations, it is not al-
ways possible to find allocations in the core. The following exam-
ple exhibits this. 
Example 2. In Example 1 , assume that carriers 1 and 3 can also
gain 60 units of saving by combining their cargo into a full truck-
load. The consolidation center operator has to choose between the
three possible pairs of carriers to arrive at the facility. Suppose,
again, that eventually carriers 1 and 2 are selected to consolidate
their cargo. No matter how the 60 units of savings are distributed
among the three carriers in this case, two of them will receive
less than what they can potentially gain together. Thus, the core
is empty. 
How should the savings be allocated among the carriers in the
above example? One might argue, as heard in our discussions with
industry practitioners, that in the above situation the entire sav-
ings must (similar to the outcome of core allocations in Example 1 )
be completely distributed among carriers 1 and 2 simply because,
as part of the selected decision for the cooperative situation, they
are responsible for realization of total savings. Although the carri-
ers seem to be symmetric before a particular solution is chosen for
the system (every pair has the same potential in creating the sav-
ings), once a decision to include 1 and 2 and exclude 3 is made,
the carriers may no longer be treated in a similar way. But there
seems to be no solution in cooperative game theory literature that
can accomplish the latter requirement. 
In situations where the core of a game can be empty, coop-
erative game theory literature suggests alternative allocation rules
that adopt a weaker notion of stability in order to suggest ways
to share the gains. The least core ( Maschler, Peleg, & Shapley,
1979 ), for instance, yields allocations wherein the maximum objec-
tion (instability) over all coalitions are minimized. The nucleolus
( Schmeidler, 1969 ), as another instance, further refines the least-
core by singling out a unique allocation wherein the objections of
all coalitions are lexicographically minimal. Although both of these
allocation rules incorporate the notion of stability to some extent
and resolve the problem of existence, they do not necessarily dis-
tribute the savings among the players who are eventually responsi-
ble for creating the total savings. In Example 2 , both the least core
and the nucleolus suggest equal allocations for the three players,
that is, 20 units of savings to each carrier. Subsequently, although
cooperation among carriers 1 and 2 eventually brings about all the
savings, carrier 3 also receives an equal share. The reason for this
is that the available allocation rules in cooperative game theory
are not necessarily linked with the final course of action in a sit-
uation and base their recommendations for allocated savings on
the players’ potential , not what they eventually do in a cooperative
situation. In other words, with the classical allocation rules there
is a disconnection between the allocation of gains and the chosen
optimal solutions. An important and well-studied allocation rule in cooperative
ame theory literature is the Shapley value ( Shapley, 1953 ). The
hapley value distributes the savings by averaging what each
layer can contribute to the savings obtained in all coalitions (in all
ifferent permutations of arrivals). Unlike allocations in the core,
he Shapley value may assign savings to players that might be in-
onsequentially removed from the situation. In Example 1 above,
he Shapley value allocates 10 units of savings to both carriers 1
nd 3, and 40 units to player 2. Thus, even though player 3 is not
elected to arrive at the consolidation center, he receives as much
rofit as player 1. In Example 2 , the Shapley value also prescribes
he equal allocations: each carrier is allocated with 20. Again, this
s because the Shapley value considers the potential contributions
f the players and disregard the selected decision for a cooperative
ituation. 
In light of the discussions above, there seems to be a gap in
he literature regarding the existence of allocation rules that ex-
licitly consider the selected decisions in cooperative situations.
n this paper, when encountered with situations whose associated
ames have empty cores, we propose an alternative approach to
ncorporate the notion of stability in an ex post sense while taking
nto account the selected optimal decisions. In this way, we prior-
tize the stability of different coalitions based on the selected so-
ution for the underlying optimization problem. To the best of our
nowledge, this approach has never been considered for operations
esearch games. 
.1. Contributions of this paper 
In this paper, we introduce and study Dispatch Consolidation
DC) games as a new class of cooperative games associated with
ogistics and operations research situations. The main results of the
aper are fourfold: 
1. For DC games with non-restrictive capacities, i.e., when
truck capacities do not impose any restriction on dispatch-
ing decisions and waiting costs trigger truck dispatches, we
prove non-emptiness of their cores. We provide a complete
characterization of the core by means of a linear program
which has up to n (n + 1) / 2 constraints ( n being the num-
ber of players in the system). This is significant because the
generic linear program for obtaining core has up to 2 n − 1
constraints. 
2. We show that the capacity restricted version of the game
can easily have an empty core. In this case, we introduce
the component-wise core as a weaker notion of stability for
DC games which imposes the no-objection requirement only
for subsets of players in the same dispatched truck in the
selected solution for the underlying optimization problem. 
3. We prove the non-emptiness of component-wise cores of DC
games in general. We provide a complete characterization of
the component-wise cores of DC games—drawing upon a key
property of component-wise stable allocations in DC games,
which requires later arriving players to compensate the de-
lay they cause for the earlier players in the same dispatch.
To calculate an allocation in the component-wise core, we
introduce an algorithm which uses a sequential procedure
to distribute the cost of a dispatched truck among the car-
riers involved based on adjusted proportions of the benefits
they receive. 
4. We introduce the notion of envy-freeness for the alloca-
tions, pertaining to any player’s willingness to swap places
with some other player, and show that although core allo-
cations are always envy-free, in DC games with restrictive
capacities envy-free allocations cannot always be found. We
formulate a linear program, in a similar vein as the least























































































































3 The assumption of common geographical destination holds in several real-life 
case studies, e.g. the consolidation center to service Regent Street in central London 
( ARUP, 2019 ). 
4 This is in line with real-life case studies where arrival times are pre-booked in 
advance and suppliers deliver their cargo to the consolidation center and leave im- 
mediately. For example, see the case study of Wilson James’s London Construction 
Consolidation Centre (LCCC) ( James, 2019 ). core ( Maschler et al., 1979 ), that finds allocations within
the component-wise cores of DC games which minimize the
maximum envy of players that are dispatched in separate
trucks. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 , we
riefly overview the relevant literature. In Section 3 , we formally
ntroduce the model for dispatch consolidation situations, discuss
he underlying optimization problems, and formulate their associ-
ted cooperative games, i.e. DC games. The gain sharing problem in
his context is presented in Section 4 . Games with non-restrictive
apacities are analyzed in Section 5 where we provide the main
esult regarding the non-emptiness of their cores. In Section 6 ,
he notion of component-wise core is introduced to address sta-
ility in games with restrictive capacities. We provide a com-
lete characterization of the component-wise cores of DC games in
ection 7 and present a proportional allocation rule therein sub-
equently in Section 8 . The notion of envy-freeness is introduced
n Section 9 along with a procedure to obtain allocations in the
omponent-wise core with minimum envy. Finally, Section 10 con-
ludes the paper. All proofs are given in the Supplementary
aterials. 
. Literature review 
In the centralized setting, optimization problems at consoli-
ation centers have been subject to several studies with various
evels of details. In a deterministic system, Daganzo (1988) studies
onsolidation strategies of shipments from several departures with
 common single destination. When arrivals at consolidation cen-
ers are stochastic, Çetinkaya and Bookbinder (2003) find optimal
ispatch policies at a consolidation center while incorporating
he time sensitive nature of cargo. Çetinkaya (2005) provides an
verview of literature in this area. More recently, van Heeswijk,
es, and Schutten (2017) propose an approximate dynamic pro-
ram to plan dispatches at an urban consolidation center with
andom arrivals, heterogeneous fleet, multiple destinations, and
ptions for spot market transport. Savelsbergh and Van Woensel
2016) review the literature on routing problems in the context of
ity logistics. 
Given the nature of consolidation centers as a point of aggre-
ating the cargo for different parties, the decentralized view of the
roblem is an indispensable part of the analysis. Zhou, Hui, and
iang (2011) study collaboration through a consolidation center be-
ween two players with a common destination and examine how
ifferent alliance settings could affect the performance of the sys-
em. Using a mechanism design approach, Zhang, Uhan, Dessouky,
nd Toriello (2016) study the application of Moulin cost-sharing
echanism ( Moulin & Shenker, 2001 ) in a consolidation center
sed by carriers with small-sized and time-insensitive cargo. In an
uction setting, Handoko, Nguyen, and Lau (2014) address the win-
er determination problem for the consolidation center’s operator
o decide how to accept bids from the carriers who are willing to
se the service. van Heeswijk, Larsen, and Larsen (2019) present
n agent-based simulation framework to evaluate the impact of
rban logistics choices on the individual stakeholders in a case
tudy of an urban consolidation center in the city of Copenhagen.
long the same lines, van Heeswijk, Mes, and Schutten (2016) look
nto urban logistics problems exploring coordination and collab-
ration among five types of autonomous agents (receivers, ship-
ers, carriers, urban consolidation center and administrator) all
ith diverging interests and stakes. Nguyen, Dessouky, and Toriello
2014) propose a heuristic for consolidation of perishable agricul-
ural products with stochastic demands and suggest a simple pro-
ortional rule to share the costs among participating suppliers.
owever, there is little research on the requirements for fairnessmong carriers which motivates the applications of cooperative
ame theory in the context of consolidation centers. 
In order to deal with the gain/cost allocation problems in
ogistics and transportation context, many authors have proposed
he adoption of well-known allocation rules of cooperative game
heory. The most investigated solution so far is the core. Özener
nd Ergun (2008) study a class of cooperative truckload delivery
ituations and show that the cores of their associated games
re always non-empty and dual solutions provide allocations in
heir core. Hezarkhani, Slikker, and Van Woensel (2014) further
elineate the possibilities and impossibilities for a complete
haracterization of the core of these games via dual solutions.
ezarkhani (2016) discusses a cooperative logistics game with
unctual delivery times and proves the non-emptiness of the
ore. Skorin-Kapov (1998) examines several cooperative games
ssociated with hub network games and highlights special cases
here the core is non-empty. Still, in several key decentralized
ogistics problems—e.g. traveling salesman, vehicle routing, facility
ocation, etc.—it is known that the cores of the associated games
an be empty. In cooperative vehicle routing situations, where the
ores could be empty, Göthe-Lundgren, Jörnsten, and Värbrand
1996) and Engevall, Göthe-Lundgren, and Värbrand (2004) elabo-
ate on the implementation of the nucleolus as the allocation rule
f choice. Hezarkhani, Slikker, and Van Woensel (2016) propose
 cost-sharing rule for collaborative routing of full-truckloads to
ncorporate the competitive position of players while addressing
he stability of the solution. Krajewska, Kopfer, Laporte, Ropke, and
accour (2007) discuss the implementation of the Shapley value
s the solution in cooperative organizations of logistics providers.
omputational complexities of finding Shapley values in large
ames have given rise to novel approximation techniques and
euristics ( Bremer & Sonnenschein, 2013; Castro, Gómez, & Tejada,
009 ). Several reviews of cost sharing problems in operations
anagement and logistics are available in the literature (see for
xample Curiel, 2008 and Deng & Fang, 2008 among others). For
 recent review on applications of cooperative game theory in
ain/cost-sharing problems specific to collaborative logistics and
ransportation see Guajardo and Rönnqvist (2016) . 
. Dispatch consolidation (DC) situations and games 
A non-empty set of carriers, hereafter players, N = { 1 , . . . , n }
ave deliveries destined for the same geographical area. 3 The size
volume) of player i ’s delivery is c i > 0. Player i arrives at the con-
olidation center at time r i ≥ 0 and, without loss of generality, un-
oad his cargo at the same time. The truck carrying a player’s cargo
eaves the consolidation center immediately after unloading. 4 We
se the terms player and delivery interchangeably. We call r i the
rrival time of delivery i . For ease of exposition we assume that
eliveries have non-identical arrival times and that N is arranged
y increasing order of arrival times, i.e., r 1 < r 2 < · · · < r n . All re-
ults hold if the latter condition is relaxed. 
Without using the consolidation center, each player could indi-
idually fulfill his delivery. The status quo cost of delivery for each
layer is known. The cost of inbound transportation to consolida-
ion center for all players is also known. Thus, the potential benefit
hat a player can obtain by fulfilling his delivery via the consoli-
ation center is subsequently assumed to be known. For delivery



















































































c  i ∈ N , we denote that latter value with K i and refer to it by player
i ’s potential. 5 
A player would achieve his potential if upon arrival at the con-
solidation center, his cargo is immediately dispatched and he pays
no additional costs. Note that actual savings achieved by a player
as the result of using the consolidation center depends on his wait-
ing time at the consolidation center as well as his payment toward
the cost of dispatch from the consolidation center to his destina-
tion. In our model we consider the latter costs separately. We as-
sume K i > 0 for all i ∈ N . That is, all players have the potential to
achieve savings from using the consolidation center. This does not
mean that all player will necessarily benefit from using the consol-
idation center—a player with positive potential may be worse off if
he is dispatched without being bundled with other deliveries or if
he (more specifically, his cargo) waits too long at the consolidation
center. 
As deliveries arrive over time, to be able to consolidate deliv-
eries in the consolidation center some deliveries must wait for the
arrival of the others. But deliveries are time-sensitive so waiting
is costly. 6 We let p i ≥ 0 be the waiting penalty rate for player i ,
that is the cost that he incurs when his cargo sits in the consol-
idation center for a unit of time. Thus, the benefit obtained by
player i if dispatched from the consolidation center at time d i ≥ r i 
is K i − p i (d i − r i ) . 7 
The consolidation center operates a homogeneous fleet with
sufficient number of trucks. Each truck has the capacity C > 0. The
cost of dispatching a truck from the consolidation center to the
common destination is W ≥ 0. We assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that the preparation time at the consolidation center for
dispatching arrived deliveries is normalized to zero. Accordingly, a
Dispatch Consolidation (DC) situation can be defined by the tuple
 = (N, c , r , K , p , C, W ) with bold notation representing n -element
vectors. In the remainder of this paper, unless mentioned explicitly,
we assume that the situation is arbitrary but fixed. 
3.1. Dispatch decisions 
The consolidation center is responsible for making decisions,
on behalf of the participating players, regarding the dispatching of
their deliveries. Acting as a coordinator in the system, the objec-
tive of the consolidation center is to maximize the overall profit
of all players. In doing so, however, the consolidation center can
choose not to accept some deliveries for handling at the facility.
Allowing a consolidation center to reject players enables the ex-
clusion of non-profitable deliveries. Thus, having the information
about the deliveries of all players, the consolidation center decides
(a) the set of deliveries which are accepted to be handled by the
consolidation center, and (b) dispatch times of accepted deliveries. 8 5 There are several case studies that publish potential savings due to use of con- 
solidation centers. For example, UK’s Waste & Resources Action Programme (WRAP) 
provides comprehensive data on potential savings in the case study of London Con- 
struction Consolidation Center ( WRAP, Waste & Resources Action Programme, 2019 ). 
The potential savings in this case comprise reduction in overall trips as well as 
avoiding congestion charges due to traveling into central London. 
6 Waiting times and associated costs are measured and controlled in several case 
studies. Janjevic and Ndiaye (2017) report numerical values of average dwelling 
times in some real-life consolidation centers. 
7 The waiting penalties can also reflect dispatch deadlines: let d i such that 
K i − p i (d i − r i ) = 0 . Then d i can be interpreted as the deadline of delivery i to be 
dispatched from the consolidation center as missing this deadline makes direct de- 
liveries more profitable. 
8 The decision on dispatching times essentially determines the duration that each 
accepted player needs to wait at the consolidation center. An alternative modeling 
approach, yet mathematically equivalent, is to consider ready times of players at 
their origins, explicitly considering the time distance of each player from the con- 
solidation center, and to require the consolidation center to advise players on their 













t  Suppose, for example, that the consolidation center accepts the
eliveries T ⊆N and consolidates them within a single truck dis-
atched at time d T ≥ 0, hereafter a dispatch . To ensure feasibility,
wo conditions must be met: (1) the dispatch time must be no
arlier than the arrival times of all included deliveries, i.e., d T ≥ r i 
or all i ∈ T , and (2) the total size of the consolidated deliveries in
 dispatch must be less than or equal to the truck capacity, i.e.
i ∈ T c i ≤ C . If these two conditions are maintained, the saving ob-
ained by the dispatch is 
∑ 
i ∈ T [ K i − p i (d T − r i ) ] − W. The saving as-
ociated with a dispatch is thus the sum of potentials of the in-
luded deliveries, minus their waiting costs as well as the cost of
 dispatched truck. 
The consolidation center’s decision structure comprises a col-
ection of dispatches, representing consolidated subsets of players,
nd their associated dispatch times. Let N be the set of all non-
mpty subsets of N and define N f = { T | T ∈ N , ∑ i ∈ T c i ≤ C} to be
he set of capacity-feasible subsets of players. The combined cargo
ize of players in each subset T ∈ N f is less than or equal to the
ruck capacity. The objective of the consolidation center operator is
o maximize the sum of savings of all players. The observation be-
ow limits the choices for the optimal dispatch times of a dispatch.
emark 1. The optimal time for the dispatch of players in T ∈ N ,
oincides with the arrival time of the last player in T . 
It is straightforward to verify the above remark. Reducing the
ispatch time also reduces the waiting times and this can never
ecrease the associated savings. Thus, at optimality the dispatch
ime can be reduced until the feasibility condition d T ≥ r i for all
 ∈ T , or equivalently for the last arriving player, becomes binding.
ubsequently, in the rest of the paper we limit our attention to the
ptimal dispatch times as prescribed in Remark 1 . In conjunction
ith the assumption of non-identical arrival times, Remark 1 im-
lies that the optimal number of dispatched trucks at any point of
ime is at most one. 
Given T ∈ N , we denote the first and last arriving delivery in
 with b ( T ) and e ( T ), respectively. Since the players are ordered
y their arrival times, b ( T ) and e ( T ) also represent respectively the
mallest and largest elements in T . Define the saving function u for
 group of players T ∈ N as 
 T = 
∑ 
i ∈ T 
[
K i − p i 
(
r e (T ) − r i 
)]
− W. (1)
n this manner, u T determines the total benefit obtained by deliv-
ries in T when dispatched at r e ( T ) , which is the earliest feasible
ispatch time for them, minus the cost of the truck. 
To find the best choice of selected players for handling at the
onsolidation center and, simultaneously, obtaining the best dis-
atching schemes, we can construct the optimization problem as a
et packing formulation: 
 (N) = max 
∑ 
T ∈N f 
z T u T (2)
.t. 
∑ 
T ∈N f : T  i 
z T ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ N (3)
z T ∈ { 0 , 1 } ∀ T ∈ N f (4)
he optimization problem above chooses the best combination of
ispatches to maximize total savings. Let z N = (z N T ) T ∈N f be an op-
imal solution to the problem above. We denote the optimal dis-
atching scheme for N associated with z N with 
 
N = { T | T ∈ N f , z N T = 1 } , (5)
nd call every T ∈ Z N a component of Z N . With this notation in place,
he maximum saving of all players can be obtained via the sum of
B. Hezarkhani, M. Slikker and T. Van Woensel / European Journal of Operational Research 279 (2019) 380–392 385 





























































































h i ∈ S 
9 Note that a DC game is a saving game. One can define a dual cost game by 
incorporating the players status quo costs and introducing additional variables for 
the selection problem. This, however, renders the formulation of the problem more 
cumbersome. avings over all components in an optimal dispatching scheme: 
 (N) = 
∑ 
T ∈ Z N 
u T . (6)
t is straightforward to see that for every T ∈ Z N we have v (T ) =
 T ≥ 0 . 
xample 3. Assume that the DC situation is as follows. There are
 players, N = { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 } . The size of all deliveries are equal to
ne unit. Suppose r i = i for all i ∈ N , K i = 10 for all i ∈ N {4} and
 4 = 5 . The waiting penalty rates are p 1 = p 3 = 2 , p 2 = 0 . 5 and
p 4 = p 5 = 5 . The cost and capacity of trucks are W = 15 and C = 2 .
n the optimal dispatching scheme for the grand coalition in this
xample—illustrated in Fig. 2 —players 1 and 3 are dispatched to-
ether at r 3 , while players 2 and 5 are dispatched together at r 5 .
layer 4 in this example is not accepted for dispatching through
he consolidation center. 
For simplicity, hereafter we use the notation λi, j = K i − p i (r j −
 i ) . The value λi , j is the benefit obtained by delivery i when dis-
atched at the arrival time of delivery j . Note that λi , i coincides
ith the potential of delivery i , i.e. K i . We provide some observa-
ions in connection with optimal dispatching schemes. 
emma 1. Let Z N be an optimal dispatching scheme for N. Suppose
 ∈ Z N . For all i ∈ T the followings hold: 
(a) λi , e ( T ) ≥ 0, 
(b) (r e (T ) − r i ) 
∑ 
k ∈ T : k ≤i p k ≤ W. 
(c) (r e (T ) − r i ) 
∑ 
k ∈ T : k ≤i p k ≤
∑ 
k ∈ T : k>i λk,e (T ) 
The first part in the above lemma estates that the benefit of
ach player included in a component of an optimal dispatching
cheme must be non-negative. This is an intuitive feature because
therwise the exclusion of delivery i from the dispatch increases
otal savings. To interpret part (b), note that the term (r e (T ) − r i ) p k 
s the improvement in player k ’s waiting cost if he is dispatched
t r i instead of his current dispatch time which is r e ( T ) . In other
ords, this term is the saving in waiting cost that k can get if he
s dispatched at r i . Consequently, the inequality in part (b) means
hat if T is an optimal component, then the sum of savings in
aiting costs that players before i , including i himself, obtain by
rganizing an alternative dispatch at r i should be small enough so
hat it would not outweigh the cost of an additional dispatched
ruck. An optimal dispatching scheme must satisfy this condition
therwise dispatching those deliveries independently (or rejecting
hem in case their associated savings are negative) improves the
otal savings. For example, suppose an optimal component includes
wo deliveries—thus dispatching these two deliveries together are
t least as profitable as two individual dispatches. The cost differ-
nce between the latter dispatch scheme and the optimal is the
ifference between the cost of an additional truck and the waiting
ost of the first delivery. In this example the condition in part
b) states that the waiting cost of the first delivery must be less
han W . Finally, the condition in part (c), requires that the sum of
enefits obtained by including the deliveries after i in an optimalispatching scheme, k ∈ T : k > i λk , e ( T ) , must always outweigh the
um of extra waiting costs of earlier deliveries. In the two-delivery
omponent example mentioned earlier, this observation requires
he benefit of the second delivery to be at least as large as the
aiting cost of the first in order to justify the wait. 
.2. DC games 
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v ) comprising a player set N ,
nd a characteristic function v that assigns a real value to every
ubset, i.e. coalition, of N with v (∅ ) = 0 . A dispatch consolidation
DC) game is a cooperative game defined in association with a DC
ituation. For every S ⊆N , let S be the set of all non-empty subsets
f S and S f = S ∩ N f be the restriction of capacity-feasible subsets
mong players in S . The DC game associated with the given situa-
ion  is obtained by defining v (S) for every S ⊆N via 9 
 (S) = max 
∑ 
T ∈S f 
z T u T (7) 
.t. 
∑ 
T ∈S f : T  i 
z T ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ S (8) 
z T ∈ { 0 , 1 } ∀ T ∈ S f (9) 
ccordingly, we can define an optimal dispatching scheme for S
ith Z S . Natural analogs for Eq. (6) and Lemma 1 also hold for ev-
ry Z S , i.e., optimal dispatching schemes for coalitions. 
A cooperative game is called superadditive if for every pair of
isjoint subsets S, T ∈ N , S ∩ T = ∅ , we have v (S) + v (T ) ≤ v (S ∪ T ) .
t is straightforward to verify that DC games are indeed super-
dditive. The superaditivity of DC games implies that the sum of
avings obtained by (optimally) consolidating players’ deliveries in
ub-coalitions never exceeds the savings obtained from consolidat-
ng deliveries in the grand coalition. Thus economies of scale are
resent in consolidation centers. 
. Gain sharing problem 
An important problem in every cooperative game is the division
f the grand coalition’s savings among the players. Let a = (a i ) i ∈ N 
e an allocation where a i ∈ R is the allocated saving to player i ∈ N .
e introduce some desirable properties that an allocation may
atisfy. 
The first property requires that savings of the grand coalition
e fully distributed among the players. 
roperty 1. An allocation a is efficient for (N, v ) if 
∑ 
i ∈ N a i = v (N) . 
In order for the players to participate in the game, their allo-
ated savings must be at least as much as they can obtain indi-
idually. Otherwise they would be better off not participating. The
ext property formalizes this requirement. 
roperty 2. An allocation a is individually rational for (N, v ) if a i ≥
 ({ i } ) for all i ∈ N. 
As an extension to the individual rationality property, it is de-
irable to distribute savings in such a way that all groups of players
eceive at least as much as they would if collaborate only among
hemselves. The notion of stability is accordingly defined. 
roperty 3. An allocation a is stable for (N, v ) if for every S ⊆N we
ave 
∑ 
a i ≥ v (S) . 




































































































10 We use the notation (·) + instead of max { · , 0}. With a stable allocation, no coalition of players can object that
they would have been better off outside the grand coalition and
on their own. Stability implies individual rationality, that is, every
stable allocation is also individually rational. The core of a game in-
corporates the properties defined above, that is, the core of a game
is the set of all efficient and stable allocations. 
Definition 1. An allocation a is in the core of (N, v ) whenever∑ 
i ∈ N a i = v (N) , and 
∑ 
i ∈ S a i ≥ v (S) for all S ⊂ N . 
Given the desirable features of core allocations, one would be
interested in examining their existence and subsequently finding
them. 
We showed earlier that the characteristic function of every DC
game is defined via a set packing formulation. As a result, DC
games are special instances of the class of set packing games
( Deng, Ibaraki, & Nagamochi, 1999 ). The following result regarding
the non-emptiness of the cores of set packing games in general
holds for DC games as well. Consider the dual program associated
with the integer relaxation of the program (2) –(4) : 
v D (N) = min 
∑ 




i ∈ T 
a i ≥ u T ∀ T ∈ N f (11)
a i ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ N (12)
Theorem 1. The core of the DC game (N, v ) is non-empty if and only
if v D (N) = v (N) , that is, the integer relaxation of the program does
not affect optimality. In this case the core coincides with the set of
solutions to (10) –(12) . 
The proof of Theorem 1 , expressed in terms of set packing
games, can be found in Deng et al. (1999) . The core of a set packing
game can in general be empty, and (as seen in Example 2 above)
so does the core of a DC game. But whenever the integrality con-
straint of the optimization problem in a given situation turns out
to be superfluous, the core of the associated game would also be
non-empty. 
5. DC games with non-restrictive capacities 
Consider the special case where truck capacities would not im-
pose any restriction on optimality. This can happen when either
the capacity is ample and/or the waiting penalties are substantial
enough that dispatches are executed before trucks exceed their ca-
pacity limits. Note that non-restrictive capacities do not mean that
all deliveries are dispatched in one truck. For example, suppose
that a series of deliveries all with a third of truck-load size ar-
rive every half an hour to the consolidation center but, in order
to make the use of consolidation center economically feasible, each
delivery cannot wait more than forty five minutes in the facility. In
this case, a truck would be dispatched every hour with only two-
third of its capacity filled. 
Definition 2. The DC game (N, v ) has non-restrictive capacities if
replacing N f with N in formulation of v (N) in (7) –(9) would not
affect its optimal value. The game has totally non-restrictive capac-
ities if for every S ⊆N replacing S f with S in formulation of v (S)
would not affect its optimal value. 
With non-restrictive capacities, the value of optimal dispatch-
ing schemes would not change if one relaxes the capacity-feasible
requirement for the grand coalition. If the same holds for all
coalitions as well, the game would be said to have totally non-
restrictive capacities. DC games with non-restrictive capacities ex-
hibit special structures that we exploit in this section to prove that
their cores are non-empty. For games with non-restrictive capacities, we first provide an
lternative formulation of the corresponding optimization prob-
em. Given S ⊆N , we call T ⊆S , a connected subset of S if for ev-
ry k ∈ S such that b ( T ) < k < e ( T ), it holds that k ∈ T . Recall that
 ( T ) and e ( T ) are the first and last arriving deliveries in T respec-
ively. Denote the set of connected subsets of S with S̄ . Let 10 λ+ 
i, j 
=
K i − p i (r j − r i ) 
)+ 
, and for every T ∈ N define ū T = 
∑ 
i ∈ T λ
+ 
i,e (T ) 
−
. For every set of deliveries T , ū (T ) gives the sum of benefits of
hose deliveries in T whose dispatch generates non-negative ben-
fits. Consider the modified characteristic function v̄ , defined for
 ⊆N as 
¯
 (S) = max 
∑ 
T ∈ ̄S 
z T ū T (13)
.t. 
∑ 
T ∈ ̄S : T  i 
z T ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ S (14)
z T ∈ { 0 , 1 } ∀ T ∈ S̄ (15)
ompared to the original formulation in (7) –(9) , the above formu-
ation replaces u T with ū T and S f with S̄ so the packing is done
ver the set of connected subsets. Our first observation in this sec-
ion states conditions under which such transformation is inconse-
uential in terms of the optimal value. 
emma 2. If the DC game (N, v ) has non-restrictive capacities, then
e have v̄ (N) = v (N) and v̄ (S) ≥ v (S) for every S ⊂ N. If the game has
otally non-restrictive capacities then v̄ = v . 
We are now ready to provide the main result of this section
egarding the non-emptiness of the core of every DC game with
on-restrictive capacities. 
heorem 2. The core of every DC game with non-restrictive capaci-
ies is non-empty. 
The proof of Theorem 2 draws upon the results of Barany,
dmonds, and Wolsey (1986) regarding zero duality gap of set
acking problems on trees via their sub-trees and incorporates the
ecessary and sufficient condition for the core non-emptiness of a
et packing game as described in Theorem 1 . Therefore, one can al-
ays find allocations in the core of a DC game with non-restrictive
apacities. In order to do so, one can solve the dual program in
10) –(12) . The latter program can have up to 2 n − 1 constraints.
nfortunately, one cannot use the dual problem associated with
13) –(15) for N —which contains only n (n + 1) / 2 constraints—to
btain allocations in the core. This is shown in the next example. 
xample 4. Assume that the situation involves three players
 = { 1 , 2 , 3 } . Let c i = 1 , r i = i, K i = 10 , p i = 1 for all i ∈ N , and
urthermore W = 4 . We have v ({ i } ) = 6 for i ∈ N , v ({ 1 , 2 } ) =
 ({ 2 , 3 } ) = 15 , v ({ 1 , 3 } ) = 14 , and v (N) = 23 . The dual solution as-
ociated with relaxation of (13) –(15) for N —which is equivalent to
10) –(12) with N f replaced with N̄ —requires that a i ≥ v ({ i } ) = 6
or all i ∈ N , a 1 + a 2 ≥ v ({ 1 , 2 } ) = 15 , a 2 + a 3 ≥ v ({ 2 , 3 } ) = 15 , and
 1 + a 2 + a 3 = v (N) = 23 . The allocation a = (6 , 11 , 6) satisfies the
bove requirements, but it is not in the core since a 1 + a 3 = 12 <
 ({ 1 , 3 } ) = 14 . 
As our next result indicates, in case of non-restrictive capacities,
here exists an alternative program, drawing upon at most n (n +
) / 2 inequalities, that obtains allocations in the core. 
heorem 3. Suppose that the DC game (N, v ) has non-restrictive ca-
acities. Let a be an efficient allocation such that for a collection of



















































































































on-negative pairwise weights (w i, j ) i, j∈ N: i< j it satisfies: 




w i, j ≥ λ j, j − W ∀ j ∈ N (17) 
hen such an a exists and any such a is an allocation in the core.
urthermore, if the game has totally non-restrictive capacities, all al-
ocations in the core can be obtained in this way. 
The conditions in (16) and (17) balance the players’ allocations
hrough a set of non-negative pairwise weights. Once these condi-
ions, along with the efficiency requirement, are satisfied the out-
ome is an allocation in the core. In case of totally non-restrictive
apacities, if an allocation is in the core of the game, it always
atisfies this set of conditions. Therefore, Theorem 3 gives a com-
lete characterization of the core for DC games with totally non-
estrictive capacities. 
xample 5. In Example 4 , the conditions in (16) and (17) can be
ritten as: a 1 + w 1 , 2 ≥ 9 , a 1 + w 1 , 3 ≥ 8 , a 2 + w 2 , 3 ≥ 9 , a 1 ≥ 6 , a 2 −
 1 , 2 ≥ 6 , a 3 − w 1 , 3 − w 2 , 3 ≥ 6 . The efficiency also requires that a 1 +
 2 + a 3 = 23 . Feasible solutions for these constraints, i.e. alloca-
ions in the core, include a = (7 , 9 , 7) , with corresponding pairwise
eights w 1 , 2 = 2 , w 1 , 3 = 1 , w 2 , 3 = 0 , and a = (8 , 9 , 6) , with cor-
esponding pairwise weights w 1 , 2 = 1 , w 1 , 3 = 0 , w 2 , 3 = 0 , among
thers. Observe that one cannot find a set of weights which,
ogether with the non-core allocation a = (6 , 11 , 6) discussed in
xample 4 , comprise a feasible solution to these set of constraints.
. DC games with restrictive capacities and component-wise 
ore 
In the previous section we showed that in every DC game with
on-restrictive capacities one can always find allocations in the
ore. When the delivery capacities impose restrictions, however,
he core can be empty—as shown in the simple example below. 
xample 6. Consider the situation in Example 4 with additional
equirement that C = 2 . We get v ({ i } ) = 6 for i ∈ N , v ({ 1 , 2 } ) =
 ({ 2 , 3 } ) = 15 , v ({ 1 , 3 } ) = 14 , and v (N) = 21 . One can verify that
he core of this game is empty. 
Recall that the stability property imposes the no-objection re-
uirement for all coalitions of players. As seen in Example 6 , this
an be too demanding and, accordingly, the core of a DC game
ith restrictive capacities can be empty. In this case, cooperative
ame theory literature suggests allocation rules such as least-core
nd nucleolus that minimize maximum objections over the set of
ll coalitions. These allocation rules treat all coalitions in the same
ay—i.e. all having the same chance of being formed. However,
n some situations, e.g. DC games, one can argue that some coali-
ions are more likely to form and some objections are more likely
o be raised. In DC games per se, players who are eventually dis-
atched together in a single truck are directly involved in working
ith each other, so if there are chances that players form coali-
ions and orchestrate their objections, players in the same dispatch
re first to spot such opportunities. The novelty of our approach
s to restrict the stability requirements of an allocation rule with
he structure of the selected solution for the underlying optimiza-
ion problem. Next, we introduce the concept of component-wise
tability. In the following definitions we assume that the optimal
ispatching scheme for the situation, Z N , is arbitrary but fixed. 
roperty 4. An allocation a for the DC game (N, v ) is component-
ise stable with regard to Z N if for all T ∈ Z N and all S ⊆T we have
 
i ∈ S a i ≥ v (S) . Component-wise stability requires the no-objection condition 
nly for coalitions of players within the components of an optimal
ispatching scheme. In this manner, it disregards the objections
hat can be raised by the collections of players from different com-
onents. Note that it is necessary for this property to be given with
n optimal dispatching scheme as there can be multiple choices in
ne situation. Subsequently, we define the component-wise core
f a DC game with regard to an optimal dispatching scheme as the
et of all efficient and component-wise stable allocations. 
efinition 3. An allocation a is in the component-wise core of
he DC game (N, v ) with regard to Z N whenever 
∑ 
i ∈ N a i = v (N) ,
 
i ∈ S a i ≥ v (S) for all S ⊆T and all T ∈ Z N , and a i = 0 for every i ∈ T
nd all T ∈ Z N . 
Let Z N = { S| S ⊆ T , T ∈ Z N } be the set of subsets of components
f Z N . In comparison with the core, the component-wise core
elaxes the no-objection requirement for coalitions in N f \ Z N .
learly, the component-wise core is a weakening of the core. That
s, every allocation in the core is also in the component-wise core.
he reverse, however, is not necessarily true. That is, an allocation
n the component-wise core may not lie in the core. 
Our main result in this section shows that despite the possibil-
ty of encountering an empty core in a DC game with restrictive
apacities, once an optimal dispatching scheme is fixed, the asso-
iated component-wise core is always non-empty. 
heorem 4. The component-wise core of every DC game with regard
o every corresponding optimal dispatching scheme is non-empty. 
In light of Theorem 4 , the notion of component-wise stability
n DC games with restrictive capacities offers an alternative way
o partially incorporate stability with regard to a selected optimal
ispatch scheme while resolving the issue of existence. Therefore,
ith an allocation in the component-wise core in this case, carriers
hose deliveries are dispatched within the same truck can never
bject to their allocations when considering possible cooperation
mong themselves. 
. A Characterization of component-wise cores of DC games 
In DC games, the component-wise cores can be characterized
y a collection of properties defined for DC situations. The first
roperty requires that the savings generated by players within
ach component of the selected optimal dispatching scheme be
ompletely distributed among themselves and any player who is
ot part of a dispatch gets zero. 
roperty 5. An allocation a for the DC game (N, v ) satisfies
omponent-wise Efficiency (CE) property with regard to Z N if we have
 
i ∈ T a i = u T for every T ∈ Z N , and a i = 0 for every i ∈ N such that i ∈ T
or all T ∈ Z N . 
So far we have considered the problem of allocating gains ob-
ained via cooperation among the players. At this point we offer
 complementary interpretation of allocations in terms of players’
ost shares. Let Z N be an optimal dispatch scheme, T ∈ Z N a compo-
ent, and i ∈ T a player in T . Given a i as the allocated saving to a
layer i define 
 i = λi,e (T ) − a i . (18) 
he value y i is the difference between the benefit that player i ob-
ains when dispatched along with the other players in T , and his
llocated saving. In this case, y i can be regarded as i ’s share of dis-
atch cost. The properties introduced in this section have intuitive
nterpretations in terms of a players’ shares of dispatch costs. For
xample, the CE property above can be expressed alternatively in
erms of the corresponding cost shares. 






























































































11 Given k ∈ T ⊂ N , for simplicity of notation hereafter we use k − 1 to refer to the 
player in T which arrives immediately before k . Property 6. An allocation a for the DC game (N, v ) satisfies CE prop-
erty with regard to Z N if for every T ∈ Z N we have ∑ i ∈ T y i = W . 
Whenever an allocation satisfies the CE property, the cost of
each dispatched truck is distributed completely among players in
a component of the optimal dispatching scheme. 
The next property formalizes the requirement for the players’
shares of dispatch costs to be non-negative. 
Property 7. An allocation a for the DC game (N, v ) satisfies Non-
negative Contribution to dispatch cost (NC) property with regard to
Z N if y i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T , T ∈ Z N . 
The NC property caps the amount of savings that each player
can obtain as the result of collaboration given the choice of optimal
dispatching scheme. This implies that if an allocation satisfies the
NC property then no player is subsidized for his waiting cost in the
selected optimal dispatching scheme. 
Next, we introduce a property with regard to the sum of allo-
cated costs to the players in an optimal dispatch. 
Property 8. An allocation a for the DC game (N, v ) satisfies Com-
pensation for Delay-caused (CD) property with regard to Z N , if for ev-
ery T ∈ Z N , | T | ≥ 2, and every i ∈ T { e ( T )} it holds that ∑ k ∈ T : k>i y k ≥
(r e (T ) − r i ) 
∑ 
k ∈ T : k ≤i p k . 
The above property states that the sum of the shares of dis-
patch costs of late arriving players in a component of the selected
optimal dispatch is always large enough to compensate for the
waiting cost of the early arriving players in that component. Thus,
this property requires that later players collectively compensate for
the delay that they cause for earlier players. 
Our final property introduces a weaker version of individual ra-
tionality for the players in components of the optimal dispatching
scheme. 
Property 9. An allocation a for the DC game (N, v ) satisfies
Component-wise Individual Rationality (CIR) property with regard to
Z N if for every T ∈ Z N , and i ∈ T it holds that y i ≤λi , e ( T ) . 
The CIR property requires non-negative allocations of savings
to players who are dispatched in the selected optimal dispatching
scheme for the grand coalition. 
Before presenting the main result of this section, we provide
an observation regarding the savings of sub-coalitions of players
within components of optimal dispatching schemes. 
Lemma 3. Let T ∈ Z N . For every S ⊆T we have v (S) =(
max i ∈ S u { k ∈ S: k ≤i } 
)+ 
. 
Our main result in this section characterizes the component-
wise core in terms of four properties defined earlier. 
Theorem 5. With regard to Z N , an allocation is in the component-
wise core of the DC game (N, v ) if and only if it satisfies the CE, NC,
CD, and CIR properties. 
The above theorem reveals the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for an allocation to be in the component-wise core with
regard to an optimal dispatching scheme. With regard to Z N , every
allocation in the component-wise core of the DC game (N, v )
satisfies the CE, NC, CD, and CIR property. Also, any allocation that
satisfies these four properties simultaneously is an allocation in
the component-wise core. In light of this characterization, one can
obtain allocations in the component-wise core of a DC game with
regard to Z N by finding the feasible solutions for the following setf constraints: 11 ∑ 
i ∈ T 
y i = W ∀ T ∈ Z N (19)
∑ 
i ∈ T : k ≤i 
y i ≥ (r e (T ) − r k −1 ) 
∑ 
i ∈ T : i<k 
p i ∀ T ∈ Z N , k ∈ T (20)
 i ≤ λi,e (T ) ∀ T ∈ Z N , i ∈ T (21)
 i ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ T ∈ Z N (22)
onstraint (19) , corresponding to CE property, requires that the
um of allocated costs to all players i within a component T of
 
N exactly covers the cost of a dispatched truck. Constraint (20) ,
orresponding to CD, maintains that within a component T of
 
N , the total allocated costs to players that arrive after a player
 ∈ T including k himself, i.e. i ∈ T such that i ≥ k , be at least as
arge as the extra waiting costs that preceding players in T , i.e.
 ≤ k − 1 , incur when being dispatched at e ( T ) instead of r k −1
which would be the earliest time that they can together dispatch
 truck). Constraint (21) , corresponding to CIR property, requires
he allocated cost to each player to be at most as large as the
enefit that the player gains in his designated component. Finally,
onstraint (22) , corresponding to NC, sets the lower bound of zero
or all allocated costs. Theorem 4 implies that there always exists
 feasible solution to the above program. Once a feasible solution
s found, it can be turned into a gain-sharing allocation using (18) .
. A proportional allocation rule in the component-wise core 
The intuitive interpretation—and often simplicity—of propor-
ional allocation rules make them appealing in real-life applica-
ions. In DC games, the benefits obtained by the players in an
ptimal dispatching scheme appear to be a logical yardstick for
llocating the savings proportionally among them. Accordingly,
ne can choose to distribute the savings obtained in each compo-
ent of an optimal dispatching scheme among the players in the
omponent based on their individual benefits. 
In the most simplistic approach to incorporate proportionality,
he savings of a component can be distributed among the play-
rs involved directly in proportion to their individual benefits. Re-
all that, given an optimal dispatching scheme Z N , the benefit of
 player i dispatched in component T ∈ Z N is λi , e ( T ) . Subsequently,
iven T ∈ Z N , for every i ∈ T define the naive proportional alloca-
ion as a 
p 
i 
= u T λi,e (T ) / 
∑ 
j∈ T λ j,e (T ) . Also, for any carrier i ∈ N that is
ot part of any component of Z N let a 
p 
i 
= 0 . The allocation a p ob-
ained in this way satisfies some of the properties we introduced
o far. Clearly, a p satisfies CE since the sum of the allocated sav-
ngs to the players in a component is exactly the savings obtained
n that component. It also satisfies the CIR property because by
emma 1 we have u T ≥ 0 and also λi , e ( T ) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ T . However,
he allocation a p does not necessarily obtain allocations within the
omponent-wise core. The following example illustrates this. 
xample 7. Assume that the situation involves three players, N =
 1 , 2 , 3 } . Also, suppose c i = 1 and K i = 50 for i ∈ N , r 1 = 0 , r 2 = 10 ,
nd r 3 = 20 . In addition, p 1 = 1 , p 2 = 2 , p 3 = 1 , C = 3 and W = 50 .
he optimal dispatching scheme is Z N = { 1 , 2 , 3 } so all players will
e dispatched together at r 3 = 20 which results in total savings of
 (N) = 60 . The naive proportional allocation rule in this case ob-
ains a p = (16 . 36 , 16 . 36 , 27 . 27) thus players 1 and 2 together ob-
ain 32.72. However, if these players do not wait for player 3 and

















































Situation in Example 8. 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
r i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
p i 5 5 2 2 10 50 10 50 10 10 












































Proportional allocation ˙ a 
p 
in Example 8. 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
d ∗
i 
6 6 8 8 6 6 8 8 10 10 
˙ yi 9.76 11.71 5.31 6.37 41.58 56.96 48.23 60.09 55 65 
˙ ap 
i 
15.24 18.29 4.69 5.63 48.42 43.04 41.77 39.91 35 35 ispatch a truck at r 2 = 10 , their saving would be v ({ 1 , 2 } ) = 40
hich implies that a p is not within the component-wise core. 
It also follows from the characterization of allocations in the
omponent-wise core in Theorem 5 that the naive proportional al-
ocation rule defined above may fail to satisfy some of the charac-
erizing properties. 
In the remainder of this section we introduce an allocation
ule that draws upon proportionality to obtain allocations in the
omponent-wise core. Given an optimal dispatching scheme Z N 
nd a component T ∈ Z N , for every l ∈ T define R l recursively as: 
 
l = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
(r e (T ) − r l−1 ) 
∑ 
k ∈ T : k<l 
p k l = e (T ) ( 
(r e (T ) − r l−1 ) 
∑ 
k ∈ T : k<l 
p k −
∑ 
k ∈ T : k>l 
R k 
) + 
l / ∈ { b(T ) , e (T ) } 
W −
∑ 
k ∈ T : k>l 
R k l = b(T ) 
(23) 
n components containing at least two players, R e ( T ) is the total
aiting cost that the last player causes all other players. For all
ther players in the component, except the first one, R l is the out-
tanding waiting cost caused by the players that come after l , in-
luding l himself, in T once the corresponding values for subse-
uent players are all subtracted. The value R b ( T ) is the difference
etween the cost of dispatching a truck and the sum of all other
layers’ allocated waiting costs. We present a technical lemma
ith regard to the sum of outstanding caused waiting costs of
layers in a component. 
emma 4. Let Z N be an optimal dispatching scheme and T ∈ Z N . For
 ∈ T , l  = b ( T ) we have: 
∑ 
 ∈ T,k ≥l 
R k = max 
q ∈ T : l≤q ≤e (T ) 
{ 
(r e (T ) − r q −1 ) 
∑ 




Simply put, the above observation states that the sum of out-
tanding caused waiting costs for the players in T that come af-
er l ∈ T , including l himself, is the largest amount of delay caused
y any group of last m players in that dispatch with 1 ≤ m ≤
 (T ) − l + 1 . In conjunction with Lemma 1 part (b), the last ob-
ervation implies that R b ( T ) ≥ 0. 
Given a dispatch T ∈ Z N , our proportional rule works recursively
nd in stages. It starts from l = e (T ) , goes backwards, and divides
he values of R l among l and the players in T that comes after l .






k ∈ T : k ≥l a 
l 
k 






λi,e (T ) if l = i 
λi,e (T ) −
∑ 
h ∈ T : l<h ≤i 
y h i if l < i (25) 
t stage l , the cost share of player i ≥ l , i.e. y l 
i 
, is a portion of R l that
s calculated based on the players adjusted benefits at each stage
fter accounting for the shares allocated to them so far. Let 
˙ i = 
∑ 
l ∈ T : l ≤i 




= λi,e (T ) − ˙ yi ∀ i ∈ T . (27)
or any player i ∈ N that is not part of any component of Z N let
˙ p 
i 
= 0 . The allocation rule ˙ a p thus is obtained from a recursive
rocedure for calculating allocations in components of an optimal
ispatching scheme for a DC game in such a way that the delayaused by later deliveries are divided among those deliveries in
roportion to their benefits that are adjusted to reflect their al-
eady allocated costs. Note that a player can only be responsible
or waiting costs of those who arrive before him in a dispatch. In
he last step, the procedure divides the remainder of costs in ad-
usted proportions of benefits as well. 
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section re-
arding the component-wise stability of ˙ a 
p 
. 
heorem 6. The allocation ˙ a 
p 
is in the component-wise core with
egard to Z N . 
The following example exhibits the results of applying this al-
ocation rule. 
xample 8. The main data for the situation in this exam-
le is given in Table 1 . In addition, assume W = 120 and C =
 . The optimal dispatching scheme in this example is Z N =
{ 1 , 2 , 5 , 6 } , { 3 , 4 , 7 , 8 } , { 9 , 10 }} which is illustrated in Fig. 3 . We
ave u { 1 , 2 , 5 , 6 } = 125 , u { 3 , 4 , 7 , 8 } = 92 , u { 9 , 10 } = 70 , so v (N) = 287 .
he calculations for this example are given in Supplementary Ma-
erial and the summary of the results are presented in Table 2 . 




is always in the component-wise core, it may not necessarily
e in the core. In the above example the aggregated allocation for
oalition of players 5, 7, and 8, is 130 but these players together
an generate 140. 
. Envy-free allocations 
The notion of component-wise stability focuses on eliminating
he objections that can be raised by collections of players within
he same component of an optimal dispatching scheme. As we ar-
ued, once an optimal dispatching scheme for the system has been
xed, the orchestration of objections by coalitions of players from
ifferent dispatches may render to be more difficult. Nevertheless,
bjections by individual players when comparing themselves with
ther players in different dispatches may still be easily raised. Such
ndividual objections can be of the following form: “I would rather
e dispatched in place of another player in a different dispatch and
eceive that players’ allocation”. The latter type of objection cor-
esponds to the notion of envy . In this section we introduce the
nvy-free property to formalize the aforementioned category of ob-
ections in DC games. 
roperty 10. An allocation a for the DC game (N, v ) satisfies the
nvy-Free (EF) property with regard to Z N , if for every non-identical
 , U ∈ Z N , every i ∈ T such that r i ≤ r e ( U ) , and every j ∈ U such that
(U \ { j} ) ∪ { i } ∈ N f , it holds that y i ≤ y j + p i (r e (U) − r e (T ) ) . 
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a  The envy free property requires that the cost-share (payment)
of each dispatched player be less than that of another player in
an alternative dispatch which is feasible for the former plus the
difference in waiting costs. In this context, the envy-free property
is satisfied if no player would prefer to be dispatched in place of
another and pays the latter player’s cost share. Our result below
shows that allocations in the core are always envy-free. 
Theorem 7. Every allocation in the core of every DC game satisfies
the EF property with regard to every corresponding optimal dispatch-
ing scheme. 
Thus, whenever an allocation in the core is considered, envi-
ous objections of the above sort can never be raised. When an al-
location not in the core is considered, however, players may be
able to object to their allocated savings when comparing them-
selves to what other players in alternative dispatches attain. It
should be noted that if the core is empty, as it can be in DC
games with restrictive capacities, there may not exists allocations
in the component-wise core with regard to any optimal dispatch-
ing scheme that satisfy the EF property. In fact, EF property cannot
always be enforced in conjunction with the CE property, as shown
in the next impossibility result. 
Lemma 5. In a DC game with restrictive capacities, there may exist
no allocation that satisfies simultaneously the CE and EF properties
with regard to an optimal dispatching scheme. 
The following counterexample proves the above statement. 
Example 9. Consider the following situation: N = { 1 , 2 , 3 } , c i =
1 , r i = i, K i = 10 , and p i = 1 for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, let W =
5 and C = 2 . We have v ({ i } ) = 5 for i ∈ N , v ({ 1 , 2 } ) = v ({ 2 , 3 } ) =
14 , v ({ 1 , 3 } ) = 13 , and v (N) = 19 . Also consider the optimal dis-
patching scheme Z N = {{ 1 } , { 2 , 3 }} . By CE property for component
{1} we must have y 1 = 5 . By EF we also must have y 1 ≤ y 2 + 2
and y 1 ≤ y 3 + 2 . Together, these conditions require that y 2 + y 3 ≥ 6
which violates the CE for component {2, 3}, i.e. y 2 + y 3 = 5 . 
In situations when envy cannot be completely eliminated, we
propose a procedure to obtain allocations in the component-wise
core with regard to an optimal dispatching scheme that reduces
envy as much as possible. The program below obtains cost shares y
corresponding to allocations in the component-wise core of the DC
game (N, v ) with regard to Z N that minimize the maximum envy
among the players dispatched in separate components: 
min ε (28)
s.t. y i ≤ y j + p i (r e (U) − r e (T ) ) + ε ∀ T , U ∈ Z N , i ∈ T , j ∈ U : 
r i ≤ e (U) , U \ { j} ∪ { i } ∈ N f 
(29)
∑ 
i ∈ T 
y i = W ∀ T ∈ Z N (30)
∑ 
i ∈ T : k ≤i 
y i ≥ (r e (T ) − r k −1 ) 
∑ 
i ∈ T : i<k 
p i ∀ T ∈ Z N , k ∈ T (31)
y i ≤ λi,e (T ) ∀ T ∈ Z N , i ∈ T (32)
y i ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ T ∈ Z N (33)In the program above, decision variables are allocated costs to
he players ( y i ) i ∈ N as well as an auxiliary variable ε related to the
layers’ envy. Constraints (30) –(33) in this program are identical
o (19) –(22) and correspond to the CE, CD, CIR, and NC properties
hich together obtain allocations in the component-wise core of
he DC game (N, v ) with regard to Z N . Taking into account the
efinition of EF Property, if a given ( y i ) i ∈ N satisfies the family
f constraints in (29) with an arbitrary ε ≤ 0, then ( y i ) i ∈ N would
atisfy envy-freeness as well. However, if EF property cannot
e satisfied, the formulation of (29) allows allocated costs to
iolate envy-freeness by a maximum degree of ε > 0. The auxiliary
arameter ε in this formulation is thus the maximum envy that
layers experience with regard to ( y i ) i ∈ N . The objective function
n (28) then distributes costs among players to obtain allocations
n the component-wise core which minimize the maximum envy
hat players experience. Our approach in formulating this program
esembles that of the least core ( Maschler et al., 1979 ). When
nvy-free allocations within the component-wise core do exist,
he procedure above obtains such allocations. But if envy-freeness
annot be enforced in conjunction with component-wise stability,
he program above yields component-wise allocations that are
east prone to envious objections. As an example, one can verify
hat the allocation ˙ a 
p 
in Example 8 is indeed envy-free. 
0. Final remarks and conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a stylized model for collaboration in
rban consolidation centers. The carriers have time sensitive cargo
nd the consolidation center operator solves a selection and dis-
atch problem to maximize the total savings that can be obtained
y the players in the system. We addressed the requirements for
aving fair allocations of gains/costs among the players in or-
er to attain stability, or reducing instability, in the cooperative
ystem. 
With non-restrictive capacities, we characterized the cores of
ssociated cooperative games and proof their non-emptiness. How-
ver, when the capacity constraints hamper the existence of core
llocations, we proposed an alternative way to incorporate stabil-
ty into an allocation rule. The rationale behind the definition of
omponent-wise core proposed in the paper is that once a decision
or the system is made and implemented, not all players have the
ame chance of forming coalitions and object to their combined al-
ocations. In DC situations in particular, we argue that the players
ho are dispatched together within a single truck in the final solu-
ion are directly in contact with each other and hence can organize
heir objections more easily while players in separate dispatches
re less capable to do so. In this manner we explicitly linked the
rocedure for obtaining appropriate allocations with the selected
ptimal solution for the system. This is a distinctive feature which
s not considered in existing solutions in the literature, as shown
n our last example. 
xample 10. Consider the following situation: N = { 1 , 2 , 3 } , c i = 1 ,
 i = i, K i = 10 for all i ∈ N . Let p 1 = p 2 = 1 and p 2 = 2 . Furthermore,
et W = 8 and C = 2 . We have v ({ i } ) = 2 for i ∈ N , v ({ 1 , 2 } ) = 11 ,
 ({ 2 , 3 } ) = v ({ 1 , 3 } ) = 10 , and v (N) = 13 . The unique optimal dis-
atching scheme is Z N = {{ 1 , 2 } , { 3 }} . Table 3 shows the results of
pplying different gain-sharing solutions in this example. The core
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Table 3 
Comparing different solutions in Example 10. 
Allocation rule a 1 a 2 a 3 














































































































n this example is empty. The Shapley value and nucleolus give
art of savings obtained by players 1 and 2 to player 3. With our
roportional allocation rule, however, the savings obtained from
he dispatch of players 1 and 2 are completely distributed among
hose two players. 
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed allocation rule in
his paper is the first to determine players’ allocations with regard
o the selected course of action for the situation and not just their
otential in the cooperative situation. As discussed earlier, in sit-
ations whose associate games have empty-cores, other allocation
ules such as the least-core, nucleolus, and the Shapley value fail
o distribute the savings solely among the players who are respon-
ible for creating the entire savings in the system. This means such
llocation rules distribute a part of savings gained in the consoli-
ation center to carriers who are not using the facility. The latter
an be a serious flaw in some real-life situations. To strengthen the
verall stability of our allocations, we incorporated individual ob-
ections to the allocated gains through the notion of envy-freeness.
ur results imply that in DC games, the existence of envious ob-
ections to an allocation renders it unstable and thus outside the
ore. We provided a linear program to minimize the maximum
nvy caused by the allocations in the component-wise core. Our
pproach can be extended to other situations whose optimal solu-
ions partition the players into distinct groups. 
There are several possible extensions to our model to account
or additional practical requirements in real world. Examples in-
lude, but are not limited to, incorporating time windows for deliv-
ries, the need for heterogeneous fleet to cater for various delivery
onditions such as temperature, and multiplicity of delivery des-
inations. Another challenging direction for future research is the
nline version of this problem. Note that in calculating our alloca-
ions, we have worked backwards from the last dispatched truck
o the first and sequentially compensated the earlier deliveries for
heir waiting costs. In the online version of this problem where the
nformation about future arrivals are not available at the time of
ccepting a delivery, the latter cannot be done any longer. There-
ore, the dynamic gain/cost sharing problem in this context would
equire a different approach which remains an intriguing open
roblem. Finally, testing our results in conjunction with real data
an bring insights about implementation challenges and shed light
n ways to make the approach taken in the paper more practical. 
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